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ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court Erred in Ruling that Ms. Myers Could Not Have Acquired 
Ownership of the Disputed Tract Through Adverse Possession. 
Ms. Fries argues that Ms. Myers could not have acquired the Disputed Tract 
through adverse possession, based on the ancient doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi, 
or 'time does not run against the king." See Devins v. Borough of Bogota, 592 A.2d 199, 
201-02 (NJ. 1991) (explaining basis and history of doctrine ofnullum tempus). What 
Ms. Fries fails to note, however, is that a hard-and-fast rule of nullum tempus is not and 
has never been the law of the State of Utah. In fact, under Utah law, publicly owned 
property that is not held for public use is subject to adverse possession. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-13; see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-2 (seven-year statute of limitations 
applies to actions brought by the state respecting title to and possession of real property); 
Pioneer Investment & Trust Co. v. Board of Education of Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 1, 99 P. 
150, 152-53 (1909) (Utah law permits application of adverse possession against state-
owned property except as specifically limited by statute). Thus, the real question in this 
case is not whether publicly owned property not held for public use is subject to adverse 
possession, it is whether any exceptions to the general rule apply to the facts of this case. 
Moreover, Ms. Fries' attempt to rely on the doctrine of nullum tempus is flawed in 
light of the disfavored status of the doctrine in modern courts. See Rutgers, State 
University of New Jersey v. Grad Partnership, 634 A.2d 1053, 1054 (NJ. Super.Ct. 
1993) (discussing "the ancient, and now almost dead, doctrine of 'nullum tempus occurrit 
regC"); Devins, 592 A.2d at 203 ("[F]or municipally-owned real estate not dedicated to 
1 
or used for a public purpose, nullum tempus is an anachronism.") (emphasis added). 
When property owned by a municipality is not in public use, courts have generally 
permitted its acquisition through adverse possession. See Siejack v. City of Baltimore, 
313 A.2d 843, 846 (Md. 1974) (noting the "well established . . . notion that municipal 
property not devoted to a public use can be" acquired by adverse possession); Goldman v. 
Quadrato, 114 A.2d 687, 690 (Conn. 1955) ("Adverse possession will run against a 
municipality, however, as to land which is not held for a public use.").1 
Here, there is no question that the Disputed Tract has not been in public use for a 
minimum of fifty years. Moreover, it is unclear whether the Disputed Tract ever entered 
into public use in the first place. More importantly, the Dedication, by its plain language, 
created a condition subsequent requiring that the alley be put into perpetual public use. 
Utah courts have recognized that "the failure of the grantee of a deed to comply with a 
condition subsequent... within a reasonable time" is "sufficient to forfeit the estate." 
Salt Lake City v. State, 101 Utah 543, 125 P.2d 790, 792 (1942). Thus, if Salt Lake 
County failed to put the former alley into public use within a reasonable time, it forfeited 
its ownership of the alley. 
Moreover, nullum tempus is based on antiquated assumptions that are even less 
applicable today than they were when Utah case law adopted its general rule that 
municipal property not held for public use is subject to adverse possession. With the 
level of resources available to modern local government bodies, it is not unreasonable to 
expect that such bodies maintain responsibility for the property they hold in the same 
manner as a private landowner. 
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Also, Ms. Fries' reliance on Henderson v. Osguthorpe, 756 P.2d 1268 (Utah 
1982), and Ecanbrack v. Judd, 524 P.2d 595 (Utah 1974), is misplaced. Neither of those 
cases dealt with the specific question of whether an alleyway originally dedicated but 
never placed into public use could be abandoned without official action. Utah courts 
have recognized the possibility of abandonment by a municipality of property dedicated 
for public use without official action when that property ceases to serve such a public use. 
White v. Salt Lake City, 121 Utah 124,239 P.2d 210, 213 (1952) ("If the street should 
cease to serve my public interest, it may be abandoned...."). Therefore, because the 
property dedicated as an alley was either abandoned or because the County's interest was 
defeated by its failure to put the alley into public use, Ms. Meyers properly acquired title 
to the property through adverse possession. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-13. 
II. The District Court Erred in Ruling that Ms. Fries Is the Sole Owner of the 
Disputed Tract Because Ms. Myers Is Entitled to, at a Minimum, Half of the 
Disputed Tract. 
Even if the alley was not vacated until the County's enactment of the Ordinance, 
the district court erred in holding that Ms. Fries became the sole owner of the entire 
Disputed Tract. There is no Utah case law holding that only property owners within a 
platted subdivision are entitled to ownership of a vacated public way that was platted 
within that subdivision. Also, no Utah court has held that the vacating of a public way 
dedicated from a certain subdivision results in reversion solely to owners located within 
that subdivision. 
Ms. Fries relies on State v. Mobile River Telephone Company, 898 So. 2d 763 
(Ala. Ct. App. 2004), to support her view that upon vacation of the alley, the entire 
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Disputed Tract would "revert" to her ownership. Her reliance on that case is misplaced, 
however, because it is based on a fundamentally different view of dedication. Under 
Utah law, upon dedication of a public road, the public obtains fee ownership, rather than 
a mere easement, in the dedicated property. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-607(l) (formerly § 
10-9-807) (emphasis added). In some other states, including Alabama, dedication results 
only in an easement held by the public. See Mobile River Terminal Co., Inc., 898 So. 2d 
at 774; Terwelp v. Sass, 443 N.E.2d 804, 806 (111. Ct. App. 1982) ("[U]nder a common 
law plat the fee of the tract purported to be conveyed remains in the dedicator, burdened 
only with an easement over the way in question and subject to the acceptance of the 
easement by the public"). Thus, under the common law in several states, the original 
dedicator maintains an interest in the subject property, which is burdened only by an 
easement held by the public. 
However, Utah views dedication differently than does Alabama or the common 
law cited above. Under Utah law, upon dedication, the alley was owned by the public in 
fee until it was abandoned or otherwise vacated. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-607(l) Thus, 
the original dedicator (and his successors in interest) held no greater claim to the property 
than did Ms. Myers and her predecessors. Under the plain language of the Ordinance: 
All right, title and interest in and to the portion of said alley being 
vacated is to revert by operation of law to the abutting property 
owner or owners. 
(Ordinance, R. at 15; emphasis added.) Because it is undisputed that Ms. Meyers is an 
"abutting property owner," Ms. Meyers was entitled, at the very least, to half of the 
disputed tract. As such, and in the alternative, the order of summary judgment should be 
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reversed and the case remanded with instructions to the district court to enter an order 
dividing the Disputed Tract equally between Ms. Meyers and Ms. Fries. 
III. The District Court Erred in Ruling that There Were No Disputed Issues of 
Material Fact. 
The district court erred in ruling that there were no disputed issues of fact and that 
summary judgment was therefore appropriate. No discovery has taken place in this case, 
and Ms. Myers has had no opportunity to explore the history of the Disputed Tract or 
otherwise establish her right to ownership. The district court ruled that there were no 
disputed issues of fact based on its conclusion that the only means by which the former 
alley "could cease to be the property of the county is by formal vacation by the county," 
which the court ruled did not take place until the Ordinance was passed. (R. at 282.) 
Substantial questions remain, however, about whether the alley ever entered into public 
use in the first place. If the alley was never put into public use, it could never have been 
owned, let alone abandoned, by the County, and Ms. Myers would be entitled to 
ownership. Thus, in light of the disputed issues of fact, the district court's order should 
be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Myers respectfully requests that the Court reverse 
the order granting Ms. Fries' Motion for Summary Judgment and remand this case for 
further proceedings. 
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DATED this 21st day of June 2006. 
BALLARl| SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP 
paylord 
Moncur 
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